Bundle pricing of inventories with stochastic demand by Bulut, Z. et al.
Available online at www.sciencedirect.comwww.elsevier.com/locate/ejor
European Journal of Operational Research 197 (2009) 897–911Bundle pricing of inventories with stochastic demand
Zu¨mbu¨l Bulut a, U¨lku¨ Gu¨rler b, Alper Sen b,*
aDepartment of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Lehigh University, 200 W. Packer Avenue, Bethlehem, PA 18015, USA
bDepartment of Industrial Engineering, Bilkent University, Bilkent, 06800 Ankara, Turkey
Received 5 January 2006; accepted 28 September 2006
Available online 21 February 2008Abstract
We consider a retailer selling a ﬁxed inventory of two perishable products over a ﬁnite horizon. Assuming Poisson arrivals and a
bivariate reservation price distribution, we determine the optimal product and bundle prices that maximize the expected revenue. Our
results indicate that the performances of mixed bundling, pure bundling and unbundled sales strategies heavily depend on the parameters
of the demand process and the initial inventory levels. Bundling appears to be most eﬀective with negatively correlated reservation prices
and high starting inventory levels. When the starting inventory levels are equal and in excess of average demand, most of the beneﬁts of
bundling can be achieved through pure bundling. However, the mixed bundling strategy dominates the other two when the starting
inventory levels are not equal. We also observe that an incorrect modeling of the reservation prices may lead to signiﬁcant losses.
The model is extended to allow for price changes during the selling horizon. It is shown that oﬀering price bundles mid-season may
be more eﬀective than changing individual product prices.
 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Bundling is the practice of selling two or more products
together. Companies engage in bundling in a wide range of
industries including information goods (e.g., software such
as Microsoft’s Oﬃce Suite), travel services (e.g., vacation
packages from travel agencies), restaurants (e.g., McDon-
ald’s Happy Meal), durable consumer goods (e.g., personal
computer options) and non-durable consumer goods (e.g.,
dishwasher detergent and rinse aid packages). Bundles are
oﬀered for a variety of reasons. Strategically, a company
may use bundling to preserve (or increase) market power,
or to extend its market power in one product to another.
Eﬃciency reasons include achieving cost savings and qual-
ity improvements and reducing pricing ineﬃciencies. See
Nalebuﬀ (2003) for a detailed discussion of the motivations
to engage in bundling.0377-2217/$ - see front matter  2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2006.09.106
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(U¨. Gu¨rler), alpersen@bilkent.edu.tr (A. Sen).The advancement of the Internet and other information
technologies has brought the practice of bundling to a new
frontier. An enormous amount of detailed consumer
buying behavior data are now available, and the E-tailers
are able to make bundling and pricing decisions in a cost-
less and timely manner. According to a survey by E-tailing
Group Inc., 88 % of top 100 online retailers suggest addi-
tional products on their websites (E-tailing Group (2004)).
For example, a customer who intends to buy the latest
R.E.M. album ‘‘Around the Sun” for $13.49 or ‘‘At the
Organ” album from The Minus 5 for $10.99 from
Amazon.com will be oﬀered to buy them together at a dis-
counted price of $22.48. Note that the online retailer does
not always need to oﬀer a discount on the bundle, as the
shipping costs are almost never linear (Amazon.com
charges $2.98 for a single CD, $3.97 for two CDs for stan-
dard shipping to US customers). Bundling or cross-selling
is also very popular for books, music, electronics
and apparel and accessories, and online travel service
providers.
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tices in the industry, there are also serious challenges for
companies that consider implementation of bundling.
First, the beneﬁts of bundling need to be quantiﬁed in
order to see whether the beneﬁts justify the potential costs
and additional complexity in operations. Also, if the com-
pany is oﬀering more than two products, it needs to specify
the number of diﬀerent bundle types to oﬀer and what
products to include in each speciﬁc bundle. For products
that are sold as part of a bundle, the company also needs
to decide whether it will continue to sell these products
individually (i.e., mixed bundling) or not (i.e., pure bun-
dling). Finally, the company needs to determine the bundle
prices and individual product prices that will maximize its
proﬁts.
Previous research on bundling in the marketing and eco-
nomics literature focuses on the identiﬁcation of demand
settings for which bundling is proﬁtable. The purchase
behavior of the customers is usually characterized by the
reservation price (maximum price a customer is willing to
pay for a product) distributions of the products. Correla-
tion between the reservation prices, complementarity,
substitutability and heterogeneity of valuations among cus-
tomers are major factors in the discussion of the proﬁtabil-
ity of bundling strategies. The earliest study to address such
issues is by Stigler (1963) who assumes additive reservation
prices for the bundle and concludes that the proﬁtability of
bundling is due to the negative correlation in reservation
prices. Adams and Yellen (1976) use the same settings as
Stigler (1963) and argue that the proﬁtability of bundling
can stem from its ability to sort customers into groups with
diﬀerent reservation price characteristics, and hence extract
consumer surplus. Considering the three bundling strate-
gies, pure components (unbundling), pure bundling and
mixed bundling, they conclude that relative proﬁtability
of these three strategies depends on the distribution of
the reservation prices and the structure of the costs (see
also Jeuland (1984)). In numerous experiments they have
provided, it is found that some form of bundling is more
proﬁtable than simple monopoly pricing and bundling
seems to be a more eﬃcient method than price discrimina-
tion. Schmalensee (1984) modiﬁes the framework of Stigler
(1963) by assuming a bivariate normal reservation price
distribution and allowing for positive correlation. He
shows that pure bundling operates by reducing the eﬀective
dispersion in buyers’ tastes, since the standard deviation of
reservation prices for the bundle is less than the sum of the
standard deviations for the two components as long as res-
ervation prices are not perfectly correlated. Schmalensee
(1984) also shows that mixed bundling combines the
advantages of pure bundling and unbundling strategies.
This policy enables the seller to reduce eﬀective heterogene-
ity among those buyers with high reservation prices for
both goods, while still selling at a high markup to those
buyers willing to pay a high price for only one of the goods.
In a comment to Schmalensee (1984), Long (1984) relaxes
the normality assumption on reservation price distributionsand also concludes that the most favorable case for
bundling as a price discrimination device is when the bun-
dle components have negatively correlated reservation
prices. Focusing on graphical analysis of bundling, Salin-
ger (1995) indicates that if bundling does not lower costs,
it tends to be proﬁtable with negatively correlated reserva-
tion prices that are high relative to costs. If bundling lowers
costs and costs are high relative to reservation values, pos-
itively correlated reservation values increase the incentive
to bundle.
Although not directly related to our study, see also
Ansari et al. (1996) for the determination of the optimal
number of items to be included in a service bundle, Ben-
Akiva and Gershenfeld (1998) for customer choice behav-
ior for bundles with correlated demand, Carbajo et al.
(1990) for incentives for bundling under imperfect compe-
tition, Hanson and Martin (1990) for the calculation of
optimal bundle prices in a deterministic setting, using
mixed integer linear programming, Ernst and Kouvelis
(1999) for the eﬀect of selling product bundles (as opposed
to price bundles in our case) on inventory decisions, and
Stremersch and Tellis (2002) for a clear discussion of bun-
dling terminology which is used in the marketing, econom-
ics and law literature in a somewhat unclear way. Finally,
we note the growing literature on bundling of information
goods (see, for example, Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999)).
However, the setting for the information goods is distinctly
diﬀerent from physical goods and most services, since the
marginal costs are close to zero and inventory is almost
never a constraint.
The basic assumption in the studies in the marketing
and economics literature is that there is an abundant sup-
ply of the products, perhaps at a certain cost. In contrast,
we assume that there is an initial inventory of items which
needs to be sold over a ﬁnite horizon. As such, we follow
the approach taken in the revenue management literature.
See Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) and McGill and van
Ryzin (1999) for reviews of revenue management research
and Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003) for a review of
dynamic pricing research and practice in this context.
Inventory considerations in bundling decisions are critical
in many product categories including travel services (air-
plane seats, hotel rooms and rental cars), event tickets,
fashionable products such as apparel and accessories and
high technology products. In contrast to previous research
on bundling, we also explicitly model the customer arrival
process and the behavior of the customers when the inven-
tory of one of the products that the bundle is composed of
runs out before the end of the horizon.
The papers that could be considered most directly
related to our work in the revenue management literature
are those studying multiple product revenue management
problems as introduced in Gallego and van Ryzin (1997).
Netessine et al. (2006) study a problem where they consider
an e-commerce seller that dynamically forms and prices
product or service packages. The problem is modeled as
a dynamic program based on two possibilities in case of
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initial request or lost sales. Our model diﬀers from Netes-
sine et al. (2006) as we assume posted prices and we explic-
itly model the consumer choice given that she is given three
alternatives upfront: to purchase either one of the products
or the bundle or none.
The speciﬁc model that is used in this study involves two
products that are sold over a ﬁnite horizon, either individ-
ually or as part of the bundle. It is assumed that the replen-
ishment decisions for these two products are already made
and no additional replenishments are possible during the
horizon. The customers arrive following a Poisson process
and each customer makes a purchasing decision based on
her reservation prices of individual products: she either
buys one of the individual products, buys the bundle or
leaves without a purchase. It is assumed that the bundle
does not require any physical integration of the products
(i.e., price bundling as opposed to product bundling), thus
a bundle purchase is possible as long as both products have
positive inventory (no separate inventory is kept for the
bundle). No cost is incurred for the formation of the bun-
dle. If the inventory of one of the products is depleted, the
customer has only two options: she either buys the remain-
ing product or leaves without a purchase. The objective is
to determine the individual product prices and the bundle
price so as to maximize the expected revenue over the entire
horizon. Although the main focus of the present study is
the analysis of bundling strategies and the impact of bun-
dling with constant prices through the selling horizon, the
analysis of this single period model allows us to extend
our model to incorporate price changes during the selling
horizon. We therefore brieﬂy discuss such an extension
and provide the dynamic programming formulation of
the problem together with a numerical example.
In a numerical study, we investigate the impact of sev-
eral factors on the optimal expected revenues, prices and
the amount of sales. These factors include the correlation
between the reservation prices of the two products, the
degree of contingency (complementarity or substitutabil-
ity), the level of the initial stocks and the shape of the
reservation price distributions. We also compare the per-
formance of the mixed bundling strategy against that of
the pure bundling and unbundling strategies. Our results
show that bundling is most eﬀective when the starting
inventory levels are high and the reservation prices are neg-
atively correlated. When the starting inventory levels for
the two products are equal, most of the beneﬁts of bun-
dling can be obtained through pure bundling. When the
starting inventory levels are not equal, the mixed bundling
strategy clearly outperforms the other two. Our numerical
study also shows that bundling is more eﬀective when the
products are more complementary and less substitutable.
To the best of our knowledge, in the bundling literature
only the symmetric and particularly the normal reservation
prices are used. However, in practice, we may expect that,
high reservation prices would have less probability than
low ones, indicating a right skewed distribution. To con-form with this intuition, we investigated the bivariate
gamma density for the reservation prices. It is observed
that if the sub optimal prices resulting from a normality
assumption are used when in fact the reservation prices
are gamma distributed, there may be a signiﬁcant loss in
the revenues. We believe this ﬁnding is important from a
managerial point of view. Finally, we extend our model
to allow for price changes, and an illustrative example with
a mid-season price change shows that the optimal initial
price is higher than the expected mid-season price. It is also
shown that oﬀering price bundles mid-season may be a
more eﬀective mechanism than changing individual prod-
uct prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
formulates the problem and introduces the model. Section
3 contains the numerical results. Section 4 extends the
model to multiple periods. Section 5 concludes with a dis-
cussion of our major ﬁndings and avenues for future
research.
2. Model and analysis
Given an initial inventory of two products and a ﬁnite
selling season, we are concerned with the problem of deter-
mining prices of the bundle and the individual products so
that the expected revenue over the selling season is maxi-
mized. To form a basis of comparison, we also study pure
bundling and unbundling strategies.
Before discussing the details of our model, we elaborate
on some of the fundamental assumptions that are used. In
our model, the retailer’s objective is maximizing revenue as
opposed to maximizing proﬁt. This is due to the following
two assumptions. First, the initial inventory levels are trea-
ted as exogenous in our model. We assume that the order-
ing decisions are already made and the retailer no longer
has any control over the initial inventory levels. Our model
can be extended to incorporate initial inventory levels as
decision variables, and this will enable the retailer to jointly
optimize his ordering and pricing decisions before the sea-
son. However, note that even in this case, the retailer may
ﬁnd it useful to re-solve a ﬁxed inventory version of the
problem, once the order is received, since he might have
more demand information after a lead time. Second, we
assume that there are no variable costs during the season.
In situations where the retailer has an additional cost asso-
ciated with selling a product or forming a bundle, our
model needs to be extended to incorporate these variable
costs. Note that if the retailer can always ﬁnd enough sup-
ply with zero lead time or he can always salvage the left-
over inventory at its original cost, our model cannot be
used. In these cases, the retailer’s objective should be to
maximize the proﬁt rate as is typically done in the market-
ing and economics literature.
We assume that the customer preferences are governed
by their reservation prices. Most commonly, the reserva-
tion price is deﬁned as the maximum amount that a cus-
tomer is willing to pay to purchase a product. We refer
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vidual consumer reservation prices and to Jedidi et al.
(2003) for capturing consumer heterogeneity in the joint
distribution of reservation prices in the case of bundling.
Other ways to model consumer behavior for diﬀerentiated
products include multinomial logit (MNL) random utility
model; see van Ryzin and Mahajan (1999) and Mahajan
and van Ryzin (2001).
We ﬁrst consider the case where the reservation price for
the bundle is equal to the sum of the individual reservation
prices. This reﬂects the assumption that the products are
individually valued and is adopted by many authors (e.g.,
Adams and Yellen, 1976; Schmalensee, 1984; McAfee
et al. (1989)). Guiltinan (1987) refers to this assumption
as the assumption of strict additivity. Venkatesh and
Kamakura (2003) relax the strict additivity assumption
and allow for substitutability and complementarity. In this
study we analyze these cases as well. If the products are
substitutable, customers want to buy only one of them at
a time. Then, a customer’s reservation price for the bundle
would be subadditive (less than the sum of the reservation
prices). Alternatively, customers may tend to consume the
two products together. These kind of products are called
complementary. When products are complements, a cus-
tomer’s reservation price for the bundle is superadditive
(more than the sum of the reservation prices).
2.1. Problem deﬁnition
We consider a retailer that sells two perishable products,
Product 1 and Product 2. There are Q1 units of Product 1
and Q2 units of Product 2 and a ﬁxed planning horizon of
length T. At the beginning of the planning horizon, the
retailer sets the price pi for product i, i ¼ 1; 2. He also pro-
vides a bundle option which implies charging the customers
less than the sum of the individual product prices if they buy
both. That is, the individual product prices and the bundle
price, pb are determined so that pb 6 p1 þ p2. In this section,
we assume that the initial prices remain unchanged until the
end of the season which is relaxed in Section 4. It is assumed
that, the retailer incurs ﬁxed costs before the selling season.
We therefore consider maximizing the revenue.
Customers arrive according to a Poisson Process with a
ﬁxed arrival rate of k customers/season. A customer is
allowed to purchase a single product or a bundle, not both.
She may also choose to leave without any purchase. We
assume that the purchasing behavior of a customer is as
follows: if the prices are lower than the reservation prices
for more than one option, then she prefers the one which
brings her the maximum surplus – the diﬀerence between
the reservation price and the price. Reservation prices R1
and R2 are considered as random variables with a bivariate
distribution with means l1, l2, standard deviations r1, r2
and correlation coeﬃcient q. Let fR1;R2ðr1; r2Þ denote the
joint probability density function of the reservation prices
R1 and R2 with corresponding marginals fR1ðxÞ and fR2ðxÞ.
For now, we assume that the reservation price, Rb, forthe bundle is equal to the sum of the individual reservation
prices, i.e., Rb ¼ R1 þ R2. Later in Section 2.5, we relax this
assumption. All the distributions are assumed to be known
to the retailer.
When both products are available, an arriving customer
compares her reservation prices for the individual products
and the bundle with their respective prices and may take
four possible actions: decides to leave without any pur-
chase, buys Product 1, buys Product 2 or buys a bundle,
with respective probabilities, a0, a1, a2 and ab. If at any
point during the planning horizon, one of the products is
depleted, these probabilities change. We denote by a01 the
probability of buying Product 1, after depletion of Product
2 and by a02 the probability of buying Product 2 after deple-
tion of Product 1. In both cases the customer may leave
without any purchase with complementary probabilities
a001 ¼ 1 a01 and a002 ¼ 1 a02. Clearly, no bundle can be
purchased if one of the products is not available. We ﬁrst
consider below the case when the retailer follows a mixed
bundling strategy.
2.2. Purchasing probabilities
When both products are available, a customer will pur-
chase nothing if her reservation prices for the two products
and the bundle are lower then their corresponding sales
prices. Hence,
a0 ¼ P ðR1 < p1;R2 < p2;Rb < pbÞ
¼
Z p1
1
Z a1
1
fR1;R2ðr1; r2Þdr2 dr1
where a1 ¼ minfp2; pb  r1g.
For i ¼ 1; 2, the customer will purchase Product i if her
surplus (the diﬀerence between the reservation price and
sales price) is positive and larger than her surplus from
the other product and the bundle. Then the probability
of purchasing Product 1 is given by,
a1 ¼ P ðR1 > p1;R1  p1 > R2  p2;R1  p1 > Rb  pbÞ
¼
Z 1
p1
Z a2
1
fR1;R2ðr1; r2Þdr2 dr1
where a2 ¼ minfr1  p1 þ p2; pb  p1g. The probability of
purchasing Product 2 is similarly obtained as
a2 ¼
Z 1
p2
Z a3
1
fR1;R2ðr1; r2Þdr1 dr2
where a3 ¼ minfr2  p2 þ p1; pb  p2g.
Observing that a customer will purchase the bundle if
her surplus is positive and larger than the surplus from
both products, we have
ab ¼ P ðRb > pb;Rb  pb > R1  p1;Rb  pb > R2  p2Þ
¼
Z 1
pbp2
Z 1
a4
fR1;R2ðr1; r2Þdr2 dr1;
where a4 ¼ maxfpb  r1; pb  p1g.
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tomer can no longer purchase the bundle. She can either
buy one unit from the remaining product or buy nothing.
The probability of purchasing Product 2 in the absence
of the Product 1 is given by
a02 ¼ P ðR2 > p2Þ ¼
Z 1
p2
fR2ðr2Þdr2:
Similarly, the probability of purchasing Product 1 in the
absence of Product 2 is,
a01 ¼ P ðR1 > p1Þ ¼
Z 1
p1
fR1ðr1Þdr1:
Since the arrival process is Poisson, the demand for the two
products and the bundle while both products are available
will follow independent Poisson processes with rates ka1,
ka2 and kab, respectively. When a product is depleted, the
sales of the remaining product will also be a Poisson pro-
cess, however with modiﬁed rates ka02 or ka
0
1.
2.3. Sales probabilities
Let N 1;N 2, Nb denote the numbers of Product 1, Prod-
uct 2 and the bundle that are sold during the selling hori-
zon which starts with Q1 units of Product 1 and Q2 units
of Product 2. Also let
P ðn1; n2; nbÞ ¼ P ðN 1 ¼ n1;N 2 ¼ n2;N b ¼ nbÞ
be the joint probability function for such sales.1 The deri-
vation of P ðn1; n2; nbÞ needs a careful consideration. There
are four possible realizations for any selling horizon: (i) No
stockout in any products, (ii) Stockout only in Product 2,
(iii) Stockout only in Product 1, and (iv) Stockout in both
products. When there is stockout in both products, one
should also keep track of the order of the stockout times
since this changes the dynamics of the purchasing behavior
of the customers. Next, the calculation of P ðn1; n2; nbÞ is
illustrated.
Case 1. No stockout in any products: in this case we have
n1 þ nb < Q1 and n2 þ nb < Q2.
Since both products are available until the end of the
season, N 1;N 2 and N b behave as independent Poisson ran-
dom variables through the selling season and we have
P ðn1; n2; nbÞ ¼ e
ka1T ðka1T Þn1
n1!
eka2T ðka2T Þn2
n2!
ekabT ðkabT Þnb
nb!
Case 2. No stockout in Product 1 and stockout in
Product 2.1 Clearly, a0ðpÞ, a1ðpÞ, a2ðpÞ, a001ðpÞ, a002ðpÞ and P ðn1; n2; nb; pÞ is a more
proper notation for representing purchasing probabilities and the sales
probability since all are functions of p ¼ ðp1; p2; pbÞ. However, for brevity,
we drop the vector p from the notation except in Sections 2.3.1 and 4.Suppose now, Product 2 stocks out during the planning
horizon but there is at least one unit of Product 1 on hand
at the end. This corresponds to having n1 þ nb < Q1 and
n2 þ nb ¼ Q2.
We ﬁrst condition on the time N, at which Product 2 is
depleted. Due to Poisson arrivals, N will have an Erlang
distribution, the parameters of which will depend on how
the depletion of Product 2 is realized. In particular, the
stockout can be experienced either by an individual pur-
chase of Product 2, or by a bundle purchase. Each of these
realizations induce diﬀerent dynamics to the system. Sup-
pose a stockout occurs in Product 2 at the time instance
n and let N 11ðnÞ be the number of Product 1 that is sold
in the interval ð0; n. If the last purchase that depletes the
inventory of Product 2 is a single purchase, then N will
have an Erlang distribution with shape and scale parame-
ters n2 and a2k, respectively. This implies that nb bundle
purchases have occurred in ð0; n. If the last purchase how-
ever, is a bundle, then N will have an Erlang distribution
with shape and scale parameters nb and abk, respectively.
This will then imply that n2 individual Product 2 purchases
have occurred in ð0; n. In either case, if N 11ðnÞ ¼ n11, this
corresponds to n11 Product 1 purchases in ð0; n and
n1  n11 Product 1 purchases in ðn; T . Let gb;hð:Þ denote
the probability density function of an Erlang variable with
shape and scale parameters b and h. Also let IðaP bÞ be an
indicator function which equals 1 if a is larger than or
equal to b, 0 otherwise.
Then, conditioning on N and how the stockout of Prod-
uct 2 is realized, we have
P ðn1; n2; nbÞ ¼ Iðn2 P 1Þ
Z T
0
AðnÞgn2;a2kðnÞdnþ Iðnb P 1Þ

Z T
0
BðnÞgnb;abkðnÞdn;
where
AðnÞ 
Xn1
n11¼0
eka1nðka1nÞn11
n11!
eka
0
1
ðTnÞðka01ðT  nÞÞn1n11
ðn1  n11Þ!
 e
kabnðkabnÞnb
nb!
and
BðnÞ 
Xn1
n11¼0
eka1nðka1nÞn11
n11!
eka
0
1
ðTnÞðka01ðT  nÞÞn1n11
ðn1  n11Þ!
 e
ka2nðka2nÞn2
n2!
:
Case 3. No stockout in Product 2 and stockout in
Product 1.
The purchase probabilities for this case are obtained in a
manner similar to the previous case. For n1 þ nb ¼ Q1 and
n2 þ nb < Q2, we have
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Z T
0
AðnÞgn1;a1kðnÞdnþ Iðnb P 1Þ

Z T
0
BðnÞgnb;abkðnÞdn;
where
AðnÞ
Xn2
n21¼0
eka2nðka2nÞn21
n21!
eka
0
2
ðTnÞðka02ðT nÞÞn2n21
ðn2n21Þ!
ekabnðkabnÞnb
nb!
;
BðnÞ
Xn2
n21¼0
eka2nðka2nÞn21
n21!
eka
0
2
ðTnÞðka02ðT nÞÞn2n21
ðn2n21Þ!
eka1nðka1nÞn1
n1!
:
Case 4. Stockout in both products.
Suppose now that both products are depleted during the
planning horizon which corresponds to the case n1 þ nb ¼
Q1 and n2 þ nb ¼ Q2. We ﬁrst observe that stockout in both
products can occur by three diﬀerent realizations: Product
1 or Product 2 depletes ﬁrst, or both can deplete simulta-
neously by a bundle purchase. Corresponding to each of
these realizations we deﬁne separate sales probabilities
PAðn1; n2; nbÞ (Product 1 depletes ﬁrst), PBðn1; n2; nbÞ (Prod-
uct 2 depletes ﬁrst) and PCðn1; n2; nbÞ (both products
deplete simultaneously) such that
P ðn1; n2; nbÞ ¼ PAðn1; n2; nbÞ þ PBðn1; n2; nbÞ þ PCðn1; n2; nbÞ:
We now derive these sales probabilities.
First we derive PAðn1; n2; nbÞ. Suppose Product 1
depletes ﬁrst at time N1 ¼ n1 and let N 021ðn1Þ be the number
of Product 2 that is sold in ð0; n1. Similar to the previous
case, the last purchase that causes the stockout of Product
1 can be either a single or a bundle purchase. If it is a single
purchase, N1 has an Erlang distribution with parameters n1
and a1k and there are nb bundle purchases in ð0; n1. If it is a
bundle, N1 has an Erlang distribution with parameters nb
and abk and there are n1 Product 1 purchases in ð0; n1.
In either case, N 021ðn1Þ ¼ n021 implies that there are n021 Prod-
uct 2 purchases in ð0; n1. The maximum value that n021 can
take is n2  1, since we have to ensure that Product 2 has
not depleted before Product 1. Also, in order that Product
2 is depleted by the end of the selling season, we must have
at least n2  n21 Product 2 purchases in ðn1; T . Letting as
before
Aðn1Þ 
Xmaxðn21;0Þ
n0
21
¼0
X1
k¼n2n021
eka2n1ðka2n1Þn
0
21
n021!
 e
ka0
2
ðTn1Þðka02ðT  n1ÞÞk
k!
ekabn1ðkabn1Þnb
nb!
and
Bðn1Þ 
Xmaxðn21;0Þ
n0
21
¼0
X1
k¼n2n021
eka2n1ðka2n1Þn
0
21
n021!
 e
ka0
2
ðTn1Þðka02ðT  n1ÞÞk
k!
eka1n1ðka1n1Þn1
n1!
;we have
PAðn1;n2;nbÞ ¼ Iðn1P 1Þ
Z T
0
Aðn1Þgn1;a1kðn1Þdn1þ IðnbP 1Þ

Z T
0
Bðn1Þgnb ;abkðn1Þdn1:
The derivation of PBðn1; n2; nbÞ is the same as the derivation
of PAðn1; n2; nbÞ, except that we now assume Product 2 de-
pletes ﬁrst.
In order to derive PCðn1; n2; nbÞ, let N12 ¼ n12 be the time
that both products deplete simultaneously by a bundle pur-
chase. Then N12 has an Erlang distribution with parameters
nb, abk, and n1 units of Product 1 and n2 units of Product 2
are sold in ð0; n12. Thus, we have
PCðn1; n2; nbÞ ¼
Z T
0
eka1n12ðka1n12Þn1
n1!
 e
ka2n12ðka2n12Þn2
n2!
gnb;abkðn12Þdn12:2.3.1. Optimization problem
Having provided the sales probabilities for diﬀerent real-
izations, we can now state the optimization problem. For
given initial stock levels Q1 and Q2, the problem is to ﬁnd
the individual product prices and the bundle price, i.e.,
p ¼ ðp1; p2; pbÞ, so that the expected revenue is maximized.
Thus, the problem for the mixed bundling case can be
expressed as
max
p
X
n1;n2;nb
ðp1n1 þ p2n2 þ pbnbÞP ðn1; n2; nb; pÞ
s:t: p1 þ p2 P pb:
The problem is a non-linear program with a single con-
straint on prices.
2.4. Unbundling and pure bundling strategies
The analysis for the unbundling and pure bundling
strategies are carried out similarly, except with modiﬁed
purchasing probabilities. In the unbundling case an arriv-
ing customer can buy nothing, buy Product 1 or Product
2 or both at a price p1 þ p2 with the following purchasing
probabilities:
a0 ¼ P ðR1 6 p1;R2 6 p2Þ;
a1 ¼ P ðR1 P p1;R2 6 p2Þ;
a2 ¼ P ðR1 6 p1;R2 P p2Þ;
ab ¼ P ðR1 P p1;R2 P p2Þ:
Pure bundling simply refers to the case with a single prod-
uct, the bundle. The customer either buys the product with
probability ab ¼ P ðR1 þ R2 P pbÞ, or leaves without a pur-
chase with probability a0 ¼ 1 ab. For comparison pur-
poses, we have included this case in our numerical study,
however such a comparison is somewhat restricted since
it is reasonable to make comparisons only when Q1=Q2.
2 As discussed in Section 2.5, we use the characterization in (1) for the
degree of contingency rather than the trivariate reservation price distri-
bution modeling in Jedidi et al.
Z. Bulut et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 197 (2009) 897–911 9032.5. Superadditivity and subadditivity of reservation prices
The analysis so far assumes that the consumer’s reserva-
tion price for the bundle is equal to the sum of her reserva-
tion prices for the individual products, i.e., Rb ¼ R1 þ R2.
When the two products are complements or substitutes,
the assumption of strict additivity does not hold. Following
the approach in Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003), we
deﬁne h to measure the degree of contingency (the degree
of complementarity or substitutability) given by
h ¼ Rb  ðR1 þ R2Þ
R1 þ R2 : ð1Þ
As noted in Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003), ‘‘correlation
in reservation prices and the degree of contingency are two
distinct notions. While the degree of contingency parame-
ter h captures perceived value enhancement or reduction
within each consumer, the correlation in reservation prices
for two products shows how stand-alone reservation prices
relate to each other across consumers”.
We note that the characterization of the degree of
contingency given in (1) is rather restrictive and forces
the reservation price of the bundle to be an exact linear
combination of the reservation prices. More general
characterizations are possible including deﬁning a trivari-
ate distribution for the reservation prices for Product 1,
Product 2 and bundle as is done in Jedidi et al. (2003).
With the characterization in (1), the purchase probabil-
ities can be calculated in a way similar to the one in Section
2.2. The purchase probabilities when there is no stockout
can be calculated by observing Rb ¼ ð1þ hÞðR1 þ R2Þ.
The no purchase probability is given by
a0 ¼ P ðR1 < p1;R2 < p2;Rb < pbÞ
¼ P ðR1 < p1;R2 < p2; ð1þ hÞðR1 þ R2Þ < pbÞ
¼ P ðR1 < p1;R2 < minfp2; ðpb  ð1þ hÞR1Þ=ð1þ hÞgÞ
¼
Z p1
1
Z a1
1
fR1;R2ðr1; r2Þdr2 dr1
where a1 ¼ minfp2; ðpb  ð1þ hÞr1Þ=ð1þ hÞg.
The purchase probability of the ﬁrst product is given by
a1 ¼ P ðR1 > p1;R1  p1 > R2  p2;R1  p1 > Rb  pbÞ
¼ P ðR1 > p1;R1  p1 > R2  p2;
R1  p1 > ð1þ hÞðR1 þ R2Þ  pbÞ ¼ PðR1 > p1;
R2 < minfR1  p1 þ p2; ðpb  p1  hR1Þ=ð1þ hÞgÞ
¼
Z 1
p1
Z a2
1
fR1;R2ðr1; r2Þdr2 dr1;
where a2 ¼ minfr1  p1 þ p2; ðpb  p1  hr1Þ=ð1þ hÞg. The
purchase probability of the second product is obtained sim-
ilarly as
a2 ¼
Z 1
p2
Z a3
1
fR1;R2ðr1; r2Þdr1 dr2where a3 ¼ minfr2  p2 þ p1; ðpb  p2  hr2Þ=ð1þ hÞg. Fi-
nally, the purchase probability of the bundle can be derived
as
ab ¼ 1 a0  a1  a2:
The purchase probabilities when there is a stockout are the
same as those given in Section 2.2.
2.6. An example
In a recent study, Jedidi et al. (2003) develop a model for
capturing heterogeneity in the joint distribution of the res-
ervation prices of products and provide three examples for
which they conduct experiments to estimate reservation
price distributions. We present below an application of
our methodology for two of their examples: a combination
of a video camera (VC) and a video cassette player/recor-
der (VP) and a combination of a microwave oven (MO)
and television (TV). Jedidi et al. provide the estimates given
in Table 1 for the parameters of the reservation price distri-
butions, assuming normality.2
Jedidi et al. use a proﬁt maximization approach to deter-
mine the optimal product and bundle prices assuming that
the products can be acquired upon the request of the cus-
tomer (or unsold inventory can be returned at the marginal
cost). Using numerical methods, the proﬁt maximizing
prices ðp1; p2; pbÞ ¼ ð520; 256; 670Þ for the VC-VP pair
and ðp1; p2; pbÞ ¼ ð235; 314; 510Þ for the MO-TV pair are
obtained.
In contrast to the work of Jedidi et al., we assume that
the inventory decisions are already made by the retailer
(which is valid for signiﬁcantly many industries) and the
retailer maximizes its revenues over a ﬁnite selling season
without any further replenishment opportunities. Using
our model, which also allows for substitution in stockout
times, with k ¼ 20 and T ¼ 1, the optimal product prices
and bundle prices are computed for a variety of starting
inventory levels for the reservation price distribution
parameters given in Table 1. The results are reported in
Table 2.
For the VC-VP pair, the products are partial substitutes
ðh ¼ 0:13Þ, and the reservation prices are strongly posi-
tively correlated ðq ¼ 0:89Þ. As seen from Table 2, when
the starting inventory levels are low, the retailer does not
utilize bundling since bundling is rather ineﬀective due to
high correlation (this will be further discussed in our
numerical study in the next section). When the starting
inventories are equal, the retailer prices the products and
the bundle so that more demand is shifted to the more
expensive VC. Finally observe that as the starting invento-
ries are increased, the retailer uses more bundling and the
expected revenue increases.
Table 1
The data for the example
Product group VC VP MO TV
Average reservation price ðliÞ 561.81 231.21 157.69 264.40
Standard deviation ðriÞ 89.00 62.89 67.34 74.73
Correlation coeﬃcient (q) 0.89 0.51
Degree of contingency (h) 0.13 0
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tutes nor complements ðh ¼ 0Þ, and the reservation prices
are moderately positively correlated ðq ¼ 0:51Þ. We note
from Table 2 that as the starting inventory levels increase,
the prices decrease and the revenue increases. If there is an
asymmetry in the inventory levels of the products, the
prices change inversely with the number of available prod-
ucts. For this pair, bundling is an eﬀective option and we
note a sharper decrease in bundle prices as inventory levels
increase.
Although the proﬁt maximization approach of Jedidi
et al. and the approach proposed in this study are not
directly comparable, we report in columns 7 and 13 of
Table 2 the expected revenues if the retailer charges the
prices ðp1; p2; pbÞ ¼ ð520; 256; 670Þ for the VC-VP pair
and ðp1; p2; pbÞ ¼ ð235; 314; 510Þ for the MO-TV pair even
though the starting inventory levels are ﬁxed as given in
the ﬁrst two columns and no further replenishments are
possible. Columns 8 and 14 report the percentage revenue
gaps. This comparison emphasizes the sub-optimality that
would result from using the optimal prices from a model
that does not take the inventory availability explicitly into
account. Note that the percentage revenue gap does not
depend on the starting inventory levels in any particular
way. In other words, there is no general condition under
which maximizing proﬁt without inventory considerations
is guaranteed to give a good solution for the problem we
consider. The solution to the proﬁt maximization problem
depends on the marginal costs, while the solution to the
problem we consider depends on the starting inventory lev-
els, the arrival rate and the length of the horizon. There-
fore, if the purchasing decisions are made a priori and
the retailer needs to sell a ﬁxed amount of stock over a sell-
ing season, she needs to consider the starting inventory lev-
els and the intensity of the store arrivals to decide whether
she should apply a bundling strategy and if so, what prices.
We should note that there are some industries (e.g., highTable 2
Optimal prices for the proposed model
Q1 Q2 VC-VP
p1 p

2 p

b EðRÞ EU ðRÞ
3 3 591 255 816 2436 2172
5 5 562 236 748 3754 3544
10 10 522 217 658 6399 6201
20 20 468 209 566 9231 7982
10 20 533 188 621 6982 6235
20 10 466 235 591 8839 7964technology) where a proﬁt maximization approach can be
used to optimize prices when the company is still using
replenishments to meet future demand. But once the com-
pany starts to operate in a liquidation mode (e.g., as in the
sales of soon-to-be-obsolete inventories), the company
should adopt distinctly diﬀerent bundling and pricing
strategies.3. Numerical results
We now present the results of our numerical study to
illustrate the impact of various factors on pricing decisions
in the presence of bundling. Our primary focus is the mixed
bundling strategy and the factors that we consider are the
correlation between the reservation prices, the starting
inventory levels and the degree of contingency. We also
investigate the conditions under which a mixed bundling
strategy provides the largest proﬁt gains against pure bun-
dling and unbundling strategies. In this paper, we report
the most signiﬁcant ﬁndings of the numerical study. For
a more detailed exposition of the numerical results, please
see Bulut et al. (2006).
In our numerical study, we ﬁrst assume that customer
reservation price pairs follow a bivariate normal distribu-
tion and investigate the impact of several factors on the
revenue with this assumption. The normal distribution is
by far the most extensively used one in bundling studies.
According to Schmalensee (1984), the Gaussian family is
a plausible choice to describe the distribution of customer
preferences in a population of buyers. The bivariate normal
distribution has a small number of easily interpreted
parameters and, due to the additive property, the distribu-
tion of the bundle is also normal. One diﬃculty working
with the normal distribution is that it allows for negative
values. As Salinger (1995) also argues, as long as an unde-
sirable product of a bundle can be disposed of freely, the
assumption of negative valuations is not warranted. There-
fore, we select appropriate parameters for the normal dis-
tributions in our numerical study to ensure non-negative
valuations.
Despite the advantages of normal distributions men-
tioned above, the symmetry property may not always be
realistic in practice for reservation prices, since we would
expect less probability for higher prices. To investigate
the impact of skewness, in the last part of our numericalMO-TV
Gap (%) p1 p

2 p

b EðRÞ EU ðRÞ Gap (%)
10.84 211 317 511 1469 1440 1.97
5.59 199 302 474 2260 2114 6.46
3.09 181 275 409 3769 2663 29.34
13.53 179 242 339 5044 2689 46.69
10.70 225 221 369 4621 2688 41.83
9.90 142 300 382 4119 2663 35.35
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vation prices over a small experimental set.
3.1. Joint optimization of p1, p2 and pb
We ﬁrst consider the case where the retailer jointly opti-
mizes the prices of the individual products and the bundle.
Throughout the numerical study, we consider a base case
to benchmark against diﬀerent cases. In this base case,
the reservation prices for both products are identically dis-
tributed with l1 ¼ l2 ¼ 15 and r1 ¼ r2 ¼ 2. The degree of
contingency h is set to 0. Initial inventories are also identi-
cal at Q1 ¼ Q2 ¼ 10. We assume T ¼ 1 and the customer
arrival rate to be equal to the total number of individual
products available, i.e., k ¼ 20. The optimal value of the
bundle price and product prices are searched over a ﬁxed
set in which prices are taken with 0.25 increments. The
results for the base case are presented in Table 3. The ﬁrst
column stands for the correlation coeﬃcient, the second
column shows the optimal prices and the third column
stands for the diﬀerence ðp1 þ p2Þ  pb. The fourth column
represents the optimal expected revenue; the ﬁfth and the
sixth columns represent the expected sales of the individual
products and the bundle; the seventh and the eighth col-
umns represent the purchase probabilities (when both
products are available).
Table 3 shows the signiﬁcant impact of the correlation
coeﬃcient on the optimal prices and expected revenues.
We ﬁrst observe that the optimal prices for the individual
products and the bundle, and the optimal revenues
decrease as the correlation coeﬃcient increases. Bundling
is most eﬀective when the reservation prices are negatively
correlated as the reservation price distribution of the bun-Table 3
Joint optimization – base case
q (p1 ¼ p2, pb) d EðRÞ
0.9 (25.75, 29.25) 22.25 290.10
0.5 (16.00, 28.75) 3.25 283.57
0 (15.50, 28.50) 2.50 279.64
0.5 (15.25, 28.50) 2.00 276.84
0.9 (14.75, 28.50) 1.00 274.83
Table 4
Joint optimization – impact of starting inventory (l1 ¼ l2 ¼ 15, r1 ¼ r2 ¼ 2)
Q1 ¼ Q2 q (p1 ¼ p2, pb) d EðR
5 0.9 (16.00, 30.00) 2.00 152
5 0.5 (16.00, 30.25) 1.75 151
5 0 (15.75, 30.50) 1.00 150
5 0.5 (15.75, 30.75) 0.75 150
5 0.9 (15.50, 30.75) 0.25 150
15 0.9 (25.75, 28.75) 22.75 417
15 0.5 (25.75, 27.75) 23.75 397
15 0 (25.75, 27.25) 24.25 384
15 0.5 (25.75, 27.00) 24.50 376
15 0.9 (25.75, 26.75) 24.75 370dle has the smallest variance in this case. An extreme case is
q ¼ 0:9, when the bundle reservation price’s variability is
very small and the retailer choose to sell only bundles.
When q ¼ 0:5, the retailer is able to attract a signiﬁcant
number of bundle customers without having to oﬀer a deep
discount on the bundle price. High bundle prices also allow
the retailer to keep the prices and the demand high for the
individual products. When the reservation prices are posi-
tively correlated, the retailer has to oﬀer sharper discounts
for the bundle. This reduces the revenue (per unit sold) for
the bundle and also reduces the demand for the individual
products despite low prices. The observation that bundling
is particularly beneﬁcial with negatively correlated reserva-
tion prices is also made in earlier research in the marketing
and economics literature; namely in Adams and Yellen
(1976), Schmalensee (1984), Long (1984) and Salinger
(1995). (However, as mentioned in Section 1, these papers
do not consider inventory availability and do not explicitly
model the customer arrival process over a selling horizon).
Next, we consider the impact of initial inventory levels
on the expected revenues and optimal prices. We consider
two other quantity combinations. Table 4 has results for
the case of limited inventories, ðQ1 ¼ Q2 ¼ 5Þ and for the
case of excess inventories, ðQ1 ¼ Q2 ¼ 15Þ. We ﬁrst observe
that when the initial inventories are higher, the retailer’s
revenues are also higher, which is expected. The optimal
bundle price decreases as the starting inventory levels
increase. When the inventories are limited ðQ1 ¼ Q2 ¼ 5Þ,
the retailer sets all the prices high, and sells a signiﬁcant
number of products individually (especially when the corre-
lation is negative). When the retailer has excess inventories
ðQ1 ¼ Q2 ¼ 15Þ, the retailer sets the individual product
prices high and sells only through bundling.Eðn1Þ ¼ Eðn2Þ EðnbÞ a1 ¼ a2 ab
0.00 9.92 0.00 0.80
1.48 8.21 0.08 0.63
1.23 8.47 0.06 0.63
0.72 8.94 0.03 0.63
0.27 9.36 0.01 0.64
Þ Eðn1Þ ¼ Eðn2Þ EðnbÞ a1 ¼ a2 ab
.08 2.78 2.11 0.25 0.25
.35 2.29 2.58 0.18 0.28
.93 2.16 2.72 0.16 0.28
.58 1.52 3.33 0.10 0.32
.31 0.84 4.04 0.02 0.40
.44 0.00 14.52 0.00 0.92
.02 0.00 14.31 0.00 0.87
.54 0.00 14.11 0.00 0.83
.06 0.00 13.93 0.00 0.81
.83 0.00 13.86 0.00 0.80
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We now consider the case where the individual prod-
uct prices are externally set and the retailer is optimizing
only the bundle price. As in Section 3.1 we use the val-
ues Q1 ¼ Q2 ¼ 10; l1 ¼ l2 ¼ 15, r1 ¼ r2 ¼ 2, k ¼ 20 and
h ¼ 0. Fig. 1 shows how the expected revenue changes
with the bundle price, for three diﬀerent correlation val-
ues ðq ¼ 0:9; 0:0; 0:9Þ and when p1 ¼ p2 ¼ 15. For all
three correlation values, expected revenue appears to be
concave in the bundle price. For all bundle prices, high-
est expected revenue is obtained for the negative correla-
tion case, followed by the no correlation and positive
correlation cases. The diﬀerences are small when the bun-
dle price is very low (i.e., most customers purchase the
bundle) and the diﬀerences disappear when the bundle
price is very high (i.e., none of the customers purchase
the bundle). The impact of the correlation on expected
revenues is highest when the retailer charges a bundle
price around the optimal. In Table 5, we show the results270
275
280
285
265
27 27.5 28 28.5 29 29.5 30
revenue
pb
-0.9
0
0.9
Fig. 1. Revenue vs. bundle price, p1 ¼ p2 ¼ 15.
Table 5
Fixed p1 and p2 (l1 ¼ l2 ¼ 15;r1 ¼ r2 ¼ 2;Q1 ¼ Q2 ¼ 10)
q p1 ¼ p2 pb a0 a1 ¼ a2
0.9 14 27.75 0.00 0.27
0.5 14 27.75 0.04 0.24
0 14 28.00 0.10 0.21
0.5 14 28.00 0.16 0.15
0.9 14 28.00 0.25 0.06
0.9 15 28.50 0.02 0.22
0.5 15 28.50 0.12 0.17
0 15 28.50 0.21 0.11
0.5 15 28.50 0.29 0.05
0.9 15 28.50 0.35 0.00
0.9 16 29.00 0.08 0.15
0.5 16 28.75 0.21 0.08
0 16 28.75 0.30 0.04
0.5 16 28.50 0.33 0.01
0.9 16 28.50 0.35 0.00of the same problem when p1 ¼ p2 is in set {14, 15, 16}
and report the optimal bundle price (in column 3) and
the optimal expected revenues (in column 9). In addition,
column 4 reports the probability of no purchase when
both products are available, and column 10 reports the
probability of purchase when only one of the products
is available. The way the correlation coeﬃcient impacts
the optimal bundle price and the optimal expected reve-
nues depends on the individual product prices. When the
individual product prices are high (i.e., p1 ¼ p2 ¼ 16),
most of the customers would not make a purchase, if
the bundle option is not oﬀered (Note that the probabil-
ity of no purchase a0 is high). In this case, the retailer
oﬀers a bundle price that will trigger non-buyers to
buy the bundle. This can be done best if the variance
of the bundle reservation price is smallest. This way,
the retailer can improve sales by small reductions
in the bundle price. As the correlation coeﬃcient
decreases, the variance of the bundle reservation price
decreases. Hence, the optimal expected revenue and the
optimal bundle price are decreasing functions of the cor-
relation coeﬃcient for high individual product prices.
When the individual product prices are low (i.e.,
p1 ¼ p2 ¼ 14), most customers would buy one of the
products even if the bundle option is not oﬀered (Note
that the probability of no purchase a0 is low). In this
case, the retailer would like to move some of these cus-
tomers from buying individual products to buying the
bundle. When the customers that already intend to buy
one of the products value the other product highly as
well (positive correlation), the retailer does not have to
oﬀer a deep discount on the bundle price to attract these
customers. Hence, the optimal bundle price is an increas-
ing function of the correlation coeﬃcient for low individ-
ual product prices. When the individual product prices
are moderate (i.e., p1 ¼ p2 ¼ 15), both of the eﬀects
above cancel each other and we do not observe any
impact of the correlation coeﬃcient on the bundle price.ab Eðn1Þ ¼ Eðn2Þ EðnbÞ EðRÞ a01 ¼ a02
0.47 4.15 5.68 273.78 0.69
0.49 3.80 6.02 273.43 0.69
0.48 3.57 6.18 273.15 0.69
0.55 2.57 7.18 273.15 0.69
0.63 1.27 8.49 273.15 0.69
0.54 3.44 6.36 284.59 0.50
0.53 2.92 6.80 281.51 0.50
0.56 2.06 7.62 279.02 0.50
0.61 1.07 8.58 276.81 0.50
0.65 0.08 9.55 274.75 0.50
0.62 2.34 7.40 289.51 0.31
0.63 1.48 8.21 283.57 0.31
0.62 0.82 8.81 279.50 0.31
0.66 0.15 9.53 276.43 0.31
0.65 0.00 9.64 274.68 0.31
Table 7
Comparison of mixed and pure bundling strategies for unequal starting
inventory levels (l1 ¼ l2 ¼ 15; r1 ¼ r2 ¼ 2)
q Q1 ¼ 5;Q2 ¼ 10 Q1 ¼ 10;Q2 ¼ 10 Q1 ¼ 20;Q2 ¼ 10
Mixed
EðRÞ
Pure
%
Mixed
EðRÞ
Pure
%
Mixed
EðRÞ
Pure
%
0.9 218.76 32.02 290.10 0.42 382.77 24.21
0.5 216.00 31.05 283.57 0.23 367.61 23.04
0 214.41 30.42 279.64 0.25 358.88 22.28
0.5 213.02 29.73 276.84 0.21 352.69 21.67
0.9 212.24 29.27 274.33 0.05 350.11 21.54
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We now compare three bundling strategies; mixed bun-
dling, pure bundling and unbundled sales. We analyze the
impact of starting inventory levels on the performances of
these strategies and explore the conditions under which
bundling is most useful. Before we discuss the results, we
note that mixed bundling is always (weakly) better than
pure bundling and unbundling strategies if there are no
costs involved. Any pricing policy in an unbundled sales
strategy can be replicated in a mixed bundling strategy
by charging a suﬃciently high price for the bundle. Like-
wise, any pricing policy in a pure bundling strategy can
be replicated in a mixed bundling strategy by charging suf-
ﬁciently high prices for the individual products.
First, in Table 6, we study the case where both products
have equal starting inventory levels. The percent deviations
of expected revenues of the pure and unbundling strategies
from mixed bundling strategy are calculated as
%deviationi ¼ ½ðEmixðRÞ  EiðRÞÞ=EmixðRÞ  100
i 2 fpure; unbundlingg:
The percentage deviation between mixed bundling and
pure bundling strategies decreases when the starting inven-
tory increases. When the retailer has a supply much larger
than the (average) demand, he sets signiﬁcantly lower
prices for the bundle to make sure that an arriving cus-
tomer buys both products. As the retailer sells more bun-
dles and fewer individual products, the revenues obtained
from mixed bundling and pure bundling approach each
other. In contrast, when the starting inventory levels are
high, the performance gap between mixed bundling and
unbundling increases. As the retailer has a larger supply,
the retailer needs to oﬀer substantial discounts on the
individual products in unbundling case, while the discounts
on the bundle price are not as deep in mixed bundling
strategy.
We observe that if the starting inventory levels are
equal, the performances of pure bundling and mixed bun-
dling strategies are quite close, especially when inventory
levels are high. However, in most applications, the starting
inventory levels will not be equal. Table 7 presents the
results where Q2 ¼ 10 and Q1 varies. As expected, the
mixed bundling strategy clearly outperforms pure bundling
strategy for unequal inventory levels.Table 6
Comparison of bundling strategies for diﬀerent starting inventory levels (l1 ¼
q Q1 ¼ 5;Q2 ¼ 5 Q1 ¼ 10;Q2 ¼ 10
Mixed EðRÞ Pure % Unb. % Mixed EðRÞ
0.9 152.08 2.21 1.27 290.10
0.5 151.35 1.73 0.79 283.57
0 150.93 1.16 0.52 279.64
0.5 150.58 0.60 0.29 276.84
0.9 150.31 0.12 0.11 274.833.4. Impact of the degree of contingency
In Table 8, we study the impact of the degree of contin-
gency on a mixed bundling strategy. The analysis is based
on our base case, i.e., l1 ¼ l2 ¼ 15, r1 ¼ r2 ¼ 2, k ¼ 20,
T ¼ 1 and Q1 ¼ Q2 ¼ 10. As discussed in Section 2.5,
h < 0 refers to the case where the products are substitut-
able, while h > 0 refers to the case where the products
are complementary. Clearly, optimal expected revenue is
an increasing function of h for all correlation values. Also,
as h increases, the retailer sells more bundles and less indi-
vidual products, despite the increasing bundle prices in this
direction. When h ¼ 0:10, the retailer no longer sells any
individual products as the bundle becomes a very attractive
option for the customers. We also see that the impact of
correlation on expected revenues remains the same for
non-zero h values. Negative correlation reduces the vari-
ance of the bundle reservation price and increases the
expected revenues of a mixed bundled strategy.3.5. Bivariate gamma reservation price distribution
So far, we have assumed a bivariate normal distribution
for the reservation prices, which is the most commonly
used distribution in this context. In order to observe the
eﬀect of the shape of the reservation price distribution,
we now consider a Morgenstern-type bivariate gamma den-
sity for a small experimental set. D’Este (1981) discusses
the Morgenstern structure and calculates the moments
and correlation coeﬃcient of the resulting distribution
which are used for our numerical results.
We consider the case where l1 ¼ l2 ¼ 2; r1 ¼ r2 ¼
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
;
h ¼ 0; and k ¼ 20 with two diﬀerent sets of initial invento-l2 ¼ 15; r1 ¼ r2 ¼ 2)
Q1 ¼ 15;Q2 ¼ 15
Pure % Unb. % Mixed EðRÞ Pure % Unb. %
0.42 5.43 417.44 0.00 12.96
0.23 3.26 397.02 0.00 7.43
0.25 1.90 384.54 0.00 4.06
0.21 0.90 376.06 0.00 1.76
0.05 0.18 370.83 0.00 0.34
Table 8
Impact of the degree of contingency h (l1 ¼ l2 ¼ 15; r1 ¼ r2 ¼ 2;Q1 ¼ Q2 ¼ 15)
h q p1 ¼ p2 pb d EðRÞ Eðn1Þ ¼ Eðn2Þ EðnbÞ a1 ¼ a2 ab lb rb
0.10 0.9 15.50 26.25 4.75 270.00 4.02 5.54 0.25 0.42 27.00 0.80
0.5 15.00 26.00 4.00 262.73 4.00 5.48 0.23 0.39 27.00 1.80
0 14.75 25.75 3.75 257.92 3.10 6.46 0.18 0.46 27.00 2.55
0.5 14.25 25.75 2.75 254.15 3.39 6.11 0.20 0.43 27.00 3.12
0.9 14.00 25.75 2.25 251.10 2.65 6.86 0.14 0.47 27.00 3.51
0.00 0.9 27.25 29.25 22.25 290.10 0.00 9.92 0.00 0.80 30.00 0.89
0.5 16.00 28.75 3.25 283.57 1.48 8.21 0.08 0.63 30.00 2.00
0 15.50 28.50 2.50 279.64 1.23 8.47 0.06 0.63 30.00 2.83
0.5 15.25 28.50 2.00 276.84 0.72 8.94 0.03 0.63 30.00 3.46
0.9 14.75 28.50 1.00 274.83 0.27 9.36 0.01 0.64 30.00 3.90
0.10 0.9 23.25 32.25 14.25 319.16 0.00 9.90 0.00 0.78 33.00 0.98
0.5 25.75 31.75 19.75 311.33 0.00 9.81 0.00 0.72 33.00 2.20
0 19.75 31.50 8.00 306.81 0.00 9.74 0.00 0.69 33.00 3.11
0.5 17.75 31.00 4.50 303.03 0.00 9.65 0.00 0.70 33.00 3.81
0.9 15.75 31.50 0.00 302.16 0.00 9.59 0.00 0.64 33.00 4.29
Table 9
Comparison of normal and gamma distributions for the reservation prices
q Gamma Normal Gamma/PN Normal/PG
(p1; p

2; p

b) EðRÞ (p1; p2; pb) EðRÞ % dev. % dev. % dev.
Q1 ¼ Q2 ¼ 10
0.28125 (2.75,2.75,3.75) 33.76 (2.75,2.75,4.25) 38.24 13.26 5.83 2.24
0 (2.75,2.75,3.75) 32.90 (2.75,2.75,4.25) 37.63 14.38 3.31 3.29
0.28125 (2.75,2.75,4.00) 32.17 (2.50,2.50,4.25) 37.00 15.02 1.89 1.32
Q1 ¼ Q2 ¼ 20
0.28125 (3.00,3.00,3.00) 41.29 (2.75,2.75,3.50) 45.60 10.45 5.62 2.57
0 (3.00,3.00,3.00) 38.68 (2.50,2.50,3.50) 43.84 13.35 4.23 3.89
0.28125 (2.50,2.50,3.25) 36.06 (2.50,2.50,3.50) 42.44 17.70 0.97 1.08
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of correlation between reservation prices are considered
which the bivariate gamma density allows: q ¼
0:28125; 0; 0:28125. The results are presented in Table 9.
In Table 9, the second and the third columns present the
optimal prices and the corresponding expected revenue
when the true distribution is gamma, and the fourth and
ﬁfth columns display similar results for the normal distri-
bution. The sixth column presents the diﬀerence between
the optimal revenues for the two models. The column
gamma/PN presents the percentage loss in the revenues
when the sub-optimal prices of the normal model are used
when in fact the true reservation price distribution is bivar-
iate gamma and the last column indicates the similar loss
when sub-optimal prices from gamma distribution are used
when in fact true model is normal.
We observe that the revenues obtained with the normal
distribution are higher than those with the right skewed
gamma distribution and the diﬀerence increases with the
correlation coeﬃcient, reaching a maximum of 17.70%. If
the optimal prices obtained from normally distributed res-
ervation prices are used when the actual reservation prices
are gamma, the revenue may decrease up to 5.62%. On the
other hand, using the optimal prices of the gamma reserva-tion prices when the actual distribution is normal results in
up to 3.89% revenue decrease. This indicates that an actual
normal distribution is more robust to deviations from
normality, whereas if the actual distribution is a skewed
gamma and if this is ignored by employing a normal distri-
bution, there may be signiﬁcant revenue losses.
4. Multi-period problem
The single-period analysis of Section 2 can be extended
to a case where the retailer updates the prices of the bundle
and the individual products on a periodic basis. Let there
be K such periods. At the beginning of period j, the retailer
can update the price of the bundle and the individual prod-
ucts based on the remaining inventory levels of the two
products. These periods can be diﬀerent in terms of their
lengths T j, customer arrival rates kj, joint reservation price
distributions and the degrees of contingency. In certain
cases, the future demand of a product or bundle can be a
function of sales in the earlier periods due to word-of-
mouth or a bandwagon eﬀect. Our model does not capture
such eﬀects and assume that the arrival rates in diﬀerent
periods are independent of each other and exogenous to
the problem.
Table 10
Comparison of two periods and single period problems
q Two periods Single period
EðRÞ p1b Eðp2bÞ EðRÞ pb
0.9 285.57 28.75 28.56 284.59 28.50
0.5 282.90 28.75 28.37 281.51 28.50
0 280.78 28.75 28.38 279.02 28.50
0.5 279.00 29.00 28.36 276.81 28.50
0.9 277.50 29.25 28.27 274.75 28.50
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for Products 1, 2 and the bundle in period j.
Let V jðQj1;Qj2Þ be the optimal total expected revenue of
the retailer for periods j through K, if she starts period j
with Qj1 units of inventory of Product 1 and Qj2 units of
inventory of Product 2. Let P jðn1; n2; nb; pjÞ denote the sales
probability of n1 units of Product 1, n2 units of Product 2,
and nb units of the bundle in period j. These probabilities
depend on the prices that are charged in period j (pj) as well
as the speciﬁc parameters of the period j. We can formulate
the problem using a dynamic programming approach. The
backward recursion can be written as:
V jðQj1;Qj2Þ ¼max
pj
X
n1;n2;nb
P jðn1;n2;nb;pjÞðpj1n1þ pj2n2þ pjbnb
þ V jþ1ðQj1 n1 nb;Qj2 n2 nbÞÞ ð2Þ
where the boundary conditions are
V KðQK1;QK2Þ¼max
pK
X
n1;n2 ;nb
PKðn1;n2;nb;pKÞðpK1n1þpK2n2þpKbnbÞ
V jð0;0Þ¼0 8j:
The recursion in (2) states that in any given period j, the re-
tailer is maximizing his expected revenues in the immediate
period j and the remainder of the horizon. If he sells
n1; n2; nb units of Product 1, Product 2 and the bundle in
period j, she collects a revenue of pj1n1 þ pj2n2 þ pjbnb in
period j and ends the period with Qj1  n1  nb and
Qj2  n2  nb units of inventory of Product 1 and Product
2. The ﬁrst boundary condition states that the last period
problem is a single period problem as modeled in Section
2. The second boundary condition states that future reve-
nues are zero if both products run out of stock at any given
period.
The retailer solves the problem V 1ðQ11;Q12Þ if the start-
ing inventory levels are Q11 and Q12 for Product 1 and
Product 2 at the start of planning horizon. The result is
an optimal price for period 1 and optimal pricing policies
(these policies are based on starting inventory levels) for
periods 2; 3; ::;K.
4.1. An example
We use the base case that is used in Section 3 as an
example for the case with two periods. The season starts
with initial inventories Q11 ¼ 10 and Q12 ¼ 10 and the
season of length T ¼ 1 is split into two equal periods,
T 1 ¼ 0:5 and T 2 ¼ 0:5. The individual products are ﬁxed
at p1 ¼ p2 ¼ 15 throughout the season. The other parame-
ters are k1 ¼ k2 ¼ 20, l1 ¼ l2 ¼ 15, r1 ¼ r2 ¼ 2 and h ¼ 0.
The results are reported in Table 10 for diﬀerent correla-
tion values. We report the optimal expected revenue, opti-
mal price of the bundle in the ﬁrst period and expected
price of the bundle in the second period (given that there
remains positive inventory of both products) for the two
period problem in columns 2, 3, and 4, respectively. As
before, expected revenues are higher when the correlationis smaller. The ﬁrst period optimal price is always higher
than the expected second period price, showing that the
retailer would like to test a higher price initially given that
she has an opportunity to mark the price down later in the
season. Table 10 also reports the solution of the single per-
iod problem (the season is a single period with T ¼ 1)
which is already discussed in Table 5. Clearly, expected rev-
enues of the two period case are higher than the expected
revenues of the single period case. We see that a second
pricing opportunity has more value when the reservation
prices are positively correlated. This is expected since the
reservation price of the bundle has higher variance in this
case and a second period gives the retailer a second chance
after resolving some uncertainty regarding the arrival pro-
cess and the reservation prices. This is in contrast to the
case where the reservation prices are negatively correlated.
In this case, the bundle reservation price has a very small
variance, and the second period helps only to resolve a por-
tion of the uncertainty regarding the arrival process. Also
note that the ﬁrst period bundle price in the two period
problem is always higher than the bundle price in the single
period problem. One interesting case is when q ¼ 0:9. In
this case, the (expected) bundle prices in two periods are
higher than the bundle price of the single period problem.
Next, we conducted the following study in order to
understand how eﬀective bundling is in a dynamic pricing
setting. In the ﬁrst period, the product prices are set to
15 and no bundles are oﬀered. In the second period, the
retailer acts according to one of the three scenarios. In
the ﬁrst scenario, the retailer still does not oﬀer any bundle
in the second period, but changes the individual product
prices based on the realization of demand. This is a simple
pricing scenario where the products are individually priced.
In the second scenario, the retailer oﬀers the bundle and
prices it optimally, but does not change the prices of the
individual products. This is a scenario in which the retailer
is perhaps oﬀering a price guarantee (or a price promise)
and is reluctant to change the prices of individual products.
Such price guarantees require the retailer to reimburse his
customer the price diﬀerence, if he reduces the price after
the purchase. Price guarantees are often used by retailers
to stop strategic behavior among customers and to encour-
age them to purchase early. Examples of companies oﬀer-
ing price guarantees include the low cost airline EasyJet
(The Daily Telegraph 2005) and the cruise line Norwegian
Coastal Voyage (Travel Trade Gazette 2005). In the third
Table 11
Eﬀectiveness of bundling in dynamic pricing
q No bundles Product prices ﬁxed All prices optimized
EðRÞ Eðp21Þ ¼ Eðp22Þ E(R) Eðp2bÞ E(R) Eðp21Þ ¼ Eðp22Þ Eðp2bÞ
0.9 272.360 14.028 279.263 26.355 280.672 20.000 27.016
0.5 273.069 14.043 278.363 26.212 279.768 19.563 26.155
0 273.755 14.038 277.253 26.262 278.652 19.211 24.990
0.5 274.379 14.036 276.219 26.414 277.614 18.635 24.002
0.9 275.199 14.039 275.707 26.620 277.099 18.200 23.563
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well as change the prices of the individual products in the
second period. The results are presented in Table 11.
Expected revenue in each scenario denotes the total
expected revenue obtained in two periods. The results show
that oﬀering the bundle in the second period is more eﬀec-
tive in generating revenue than updating the individual
product prices. The diﬀerence can be signiﬁcant when the
product reservation prices are negatively correlated. Obvi-
ously, the ﬂexibility of changing the individual product
prices in addition to oﬀering a bundle option further
increases revenues. However, the additional beneﬁts are
smaller. We conclude that oﬀering price bundles can be
an important alternative to dynamic pricing of individual
products.5. Conclusion
In this study, we consider the optimal bundle pricing
policy of a retailer with two perishable products with the
objective of maximizing the revenue. We assume that the
retailer adopts a mixed bundling strategy where the two
products can be sold separately or as a bundle. The two
products are available in limited quantities and there is
no replenishment opportunity during the planning horizon.
Customers arrive at the retailer according to a Poisson Pro-
cess and their purchase probabilities are governed by the
reservation prices. The bundle reservation price can be
additive, subadditive or superadditive, the last two of
which reﬂect the substitutability and complementarity of
the products, respectively. An exact expression is derived
for the expected proﬁt of the selling horizon and is maxi-
mized with respect to the prices of the products and the
bundle using numerical methods. A numerical study is con-
ducted to investigate the impact of the initial inventory lev-
els, covariance of the reservation prices, substitutability
and complementarity on the optimal prices and the result-
ing optimal revenues. Furthermore, the comparison among
unbundling, mixed and pure bundling strategies are also
provided.
Our numerical results indicate that the performances of
the policies heavily depend on the parameters of the
demand process and the initial inventory levels. Bundling
is observed to be most eﬀective with negatively correlated
reservation prices and when the supply quantities are
large. It is also observed that the mixed bundling and purebundling strategies perform similarly when the supply
quantities are large and equal; however, the mixed bun-
dling strategy provides signiﬁcant savings over pure bun-
dling when the supply quantities are unequal. Our
numerical results also show that bundling becomes more
eﬀective as the degree of contingency increases (products
become less substitutable and more complementary). By
employing a bivariate gamma distribution for the reserva-
tion prices, we also show that the shape of this distribu-
tion is important and using sub-optimal prices resulting
from assumed normal reservation prices, when in fact
the bivariate gamma better ﬁts the actual distribution
may result in signiﬁcant losses especially for negatively
correlated reservation prices. This observation seems to
have important managerial implications and is worth fur-
ther study. Based on our analysis with constant product
and bundle prices throughout the selling season, we also
provided an extension of our model to allow for price
changes in a multi-period setting using a dynamic pro-
gramming formulation. Using a two-period numerical
example, it is shown that oﬀering price bundles mid–sea-
son could be an eﬀective alternative to updating individual
product prices.
A worthy but complex extension of our work could be
the integration of actions of the competitors in pricing deci-
sions. Our model assumes that the inventory decisions are
already made, the retailer has no other costs, and he is
maximizing his expected revenue over a selling season.
Extensions of our model to incorporate initial inventory
levels as additional decision variables and to incorporate
the variable cost of selling a product and/or forming a bun-
dle are possible. Using the extended model, additional
insights can be gained and comparative performances of
diﬀerent bundling strategies can be investigated through
further numerical studies. One may also consider a price
change at a time when one of the products depletes. In this
case, a cost for price changes could also be considered.
Finally, the multi-period model can be extended to allow
the retailer to replenish product inventories periodically.References
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